

## Market Focus

### Research Analysts

James Sweeney  
 212 538 4648  
[james.sweeney@credit-suisse.com](mailto:james.sweeney@credit-suisse.com)

Jonathan Wilmot  
 +44 20 7888 3807  
[jonathan.wilmot@credit-suisse.com](mailto:jonathan.wilmot@credit-suisse.com)

Matthias Klein  
 +44 20 7883 8189  
[matthias.klein@credit-suisse.com](mailto:matthias.klein@credit-suisse.com)

Aimi Plant  
 +44 20 7888 7054  
[aimi.plant@credit-suisse.com](mailto:aimi.plant@credit-suisse.com)

Wenzhe Zhao  
 212 325 1798  
[wenzhe.zhao@credit-suisse.com](mailto:wenzhe.zhao@credit-suisse.com)

Jeremy Schwartz  
 212 538 6419  
[jeremy.schwartz@credit-suisse.com](mailto:jeremy.schwartz@credit-suisse.com)

### When?

The latest FOMC statement invites the whole market to examine how long it might take before the unemployment rate reaches 6.5% – the upper edge of the Fed’s “full employment zone.”

We look at three labor supply and growth scenarios: “Strong,” “Status Quo,” (trending around 2.5% p.a.), and “Feeble” (well below trend).

On the strong or “status quo” paths, the timing is between mid-2015 and mid-2016. On the feeble growth scenario, unemployment does not fall below 6.5% in the next five years.

Obviously, changes in the unemployment rate depend on the balance between jobs growth and changes in labor force participation, which has fallen sharply over the past three years. So despite lackluster jobs growth the unemployment rate has fallen significantly.

Forecasting labor force participation is just as difficult as forecasting (jobs) growth or the Fed’s reaction function a few years hence, but a lot less familiar. So it is fair to say that understanding participation is the key to understanding the future path of unemployment and the moment at which the market will expect the Fed to start tightening.

In our view there are four main drivers of participation. In order of importance they are: male-female labor supply dynamics; the age structure of the population; the level of wages across all jobs, which closely link the participation of certain age-sex cohort groups to others, (e.g., more older workers means fewer younger workers); and the business cycle (when few jobs are available more people drop out of the labor force, whether temporarily or permanently).


These four drivers are illustrated graphically at the end of the piece, together with projections of how participation rates might evolve under different scenarios. The key judgments we are making in our scenario analysis is that there is some potential for a cyclical rebound in participation, despite powerful demographic headwinds. In any case, hard judgments about both participation and jobs growth are needed to analyze when the FOMC’s criteria could be met.

The very fact that such an exercise is deeply market-relevant marks an important shift. The widespread “Japanization” view is being questioned and focus is returning to the possibility of future policy hikes and the right level of the terminal rate.

From now on demographics is likely to crop up whenever bond investors debate the big “When?”


ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES ARE IN THE DISCLOSURE APPENDIX. FOR OTHER IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, PLEASE REFER TO <https://firesearchdisclosure.credit-suisse.com>.

**Exhibit 1: US labor force participation rate**




Source: Credit Suisse, Thomson Reuters DataStream

**Exhibit 2: Participation rates by age**



Source: Credit Suisse, Thomson Reuters DataStream

**Exhibit 3: Average participation and population by age cohort**



Source: Credit Suisse, Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Census Bureau

### The Devil in the Demographic Details

Exhibit 1 shows the US participation rate since 1950. The large secular increase between the mid-1960s and late-1980s is driven by rising female participation. Rising female participation over time has been loosely correlated with falling male participation. This might reflect changes in the types of jobs that exist, the crowding out of males by females in certain occupations, and the ability for some males not to work because of higher female earnings. But the actual level of overall male participation remains significantly above female participation (70% versus 58%), and seemed to be just starting to stabilize when the Great Recession hit in 2008-2009.

Exhibit 2 shows overall participation rates of different age cohorts in 2011 and 1990. The trend toward older workers retiring later is visible in the slightly elevated right tail of the distributions. However, what stands out is the ineluctably steep decline in average participation as workers move through their sixties. With baby boomers now entering those years – those born in 1948 turn 65 in 2013 – average participation faces a major demographic headwind, and it is buckling under this pressure.

Exhibit 3 shows in pink the participation rate for each cohort again, but now plots a histogram of the population by age on top of it, for 2000, 2012, and 2020. Note that in 2000 population size fell off steeply from the mid-40s. Twelve years later and the decline begins in the late 50s, with a large group that has already entered the zone where falling participation and rising retirements dominate. In 2020 this will be further along.

Rising retirements and falling participation rates, all things equal, mean fewer jobs are needed to keep the unemployment rate steady. Although most market participants think the economy needs to grow something like 150 thousand net jobs per month in equilibrium, in reality “required jobs growth” varies due to the underlying participation dynamics. Exhibit 4 shows historical jobs growth needed to keep the unemployment rate steady. It peaked near 270 thousand in 1978, as the baby boom cohort was entering the labor force in spades, and female participation was in the middle of its secular increase.

It troughed near -40 thousand two years ago. In general, no jobs growth has been needed over the past few years to cause the unemployment rate to fall, because of falling participation. On the most recent (highly smoothed) data, jobs growth must trend near 80 thousand to keep the unemployment rate sideways.

Where “required jobs growth” goes next is critical now that the Fed has tied its policy outlook to the unemployment rate. We estimate this cautiously: household survey employment growth is notoriously volatile relative to other measures of jobs. Along with uncertain participation dynamics, this adds to the potential uncertainty about Fed policy. But for better or worse the unemployment rate is the new benchmark, and that’s unlikely to change soon.


Exhibit 5 shows three scenarios for labor force participation, which we have carefully constructed by paying close attention to all four factors mentioned above, including how each cohort group appears to impact the others, and any long-term or shorter-term underlying trends.

**Exhibit 4: Required jobs growth**




Source: Credit Suisse, Thomson Reuters DataStream

**Exhibit 5: Participation rate scenarios**



Source: Credit Suisse, Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Census Bureau

**Exhibit 6: Required jobs growth forecast**



Source: Credit Suisse, Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Census Bureau

Exhibit 6 shows how “required” jobs growth and unemployment would evolve under each of our scenarios. Exhibits 9-18 detail the granular assumptions for different cohort group in each case.


Our weak scenario has overall participation continuing to plunge at the rate of the past few years. This would likely require worse growth than we’ve gotten, perhaps as low as 1% p.a., with jobs growth of just 50 thousand per month. Because required jobs growth would be slightly below that, the unemployment rate would mostly go sideways and fall only gently on a four-year horizon. The Fed’s criteria would not be met by 2017.

Our mild scenario has participation rates staying roughly constant for all but older workers, for whom it would increase. This we think might coincide with ongoing 2%-2.5% GDP growth and 160 thousand per month in jobs growth. The unemployment rate would hit roughly 6.5% by mid-2016. Our economists and the Fed’s own GDP growth projections are stronger than this one, but it is worth noting that even under quite mild growth the Fed should will be hiking in 2016.

In our strong scenario we assume a rebound in youth participation, an increase in middle age participation that is slightly less strong for men given their long-term downtrend, and an increase in elderly participation that is even faster than the recent trend increase. In this state of the world, GDP growth would be strong, likely above 3% p.a. for a few years, and jobs growth might be trending around 250K. Because of rising participation, around 170K jobs per month would be needed to keep unemployment sideways, and so the unemployment rate would fall to around 6.5% by mid-2015. The Fed would be hiking early on this scenario.

We see the steep drop in 2009 and 2010 as mostly a cyclical (largely temporary) drop in participation rates. But in 2011 and 2012 it appears age structure has been the dominant factor. Exhibit 7 shows in gray an adjusted participation rate in which the relative sizes of each cohort group are held constant. The cyclical decline is visible, but the stabilization in the age-adjusted rate since 2011 is striking. This supports our relatively “optimistic” view on labor supply that a cyclical rebound will offset some of the ongoing demographic pressures.

**Exhibit 7: Demographic-adjusted labor force participation**




Source: Credit Suisse, Thomson Reuters DataStream

Our analysis may be similar to that done by the Fed itself in preparation for its announcement. The timing is certainly close. But the Fed’s move was risky because reality is unlikely to be as neat as our scenarios. For the market, the key is that under strong or moderate growth a hiking cycle is likely to begin by mid-2016 at the latest.

This is consistent with the Fed's statements but not necessarily with market action. 2-year swaption volatility three years forward has risen recently but remains close to its recent historical low. The market is priced for extremely low volatility precisely when the Fed suggests a hiking cycle will begin!

### Exhibit 8: Two-Year Annualized Swaption Volatility Three Years Forward



Source: Credit Suisse Locus


When hiking cycles begin markets generally price in a full tightening cycle. Dec 2019 Eurodollars are near 3%, suggesting either a low expectation of hikes, a low terminal rate (as opposed to the FOMC's view which is near 4%), or an economy which is expected to buckle quickly under the stress of higher interest rates.

Longer term an interesting secular trend emerges. All the coming retirements will exacerbate growing labor shortages in certain industries, especially those who have trouble finding adequately trained graduates. This will cause volatility in wages and put sharp upward pressure on some wages. But this need not cause aggregate wage pressure. And significant wage-related price inflation would require much tighter margins, lower productivity (high unit labor costs), and rising wages.


While those emerging trends will drive interesting new economic opportunities, the appropriate policy response to a move toward full employment is tightening. The arguments against tightening often center around debt or liability issues but in our view low rates ultimately cannot solve these problems.

Unless growth slows sharply then, rate hikes will likely commence a few years out, and markets have only just begun to price for this possibility. With negative global front-end rates strongly impacting valuations across all asset classes at the moment, the implications will be huge. But in 2013 we begin slowly, with some curve steepening and some across-the-curve backup. Further prematurely priced tightening may come in the weeks ahead, only later to be priced out and back in again several times before the real thing finally but inevitably arrives.


**Exhibit 9: 16-24 participation**




**Exhibit 10: Male 25-44 participation**




**Exhibit 11: Female 25-44 participation**




**Exhibit 12: Male 45-54 participation**



**Exhibit 13: Female 45-54 participation**




**Exhibit 14: 55-59 participation**




Source: Credit Suisse, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Source: Credit Suisse, Bureau of Labor Statistics


**Exhibit 15: 60-64 participation**



**Exhibit 16: 65-69 participation**




**Exhibit 17: 70-74 participation**



Source: Credit Suisse, Bureau of Labor Statistics

**Exhibit 18: >75 participation**



Source: Credit Suisse

## FIXED INCOME GLOBAL STRATEGY RESEARCH

**Jonathan Wilmot, Managing Director**  
**Chief Global Strategist**  
+44 20 7888 3807  
jonathan.wilmot@credit-suisse.com

**Eric Miller, Managing Director**  
**Global Head of Fixed Income and Economic Research**  
+1 212 538 6480  
eric.miller.3@credit-suisse.com

### LONDON

One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, United Kingdom

---

**Paul McGinnie, Director**  
+44 20 7883 6481  
paul.mcginnie@credit-suisse.com

---

**Matthias Klein, Director**  
+44 20 7883 8189  
matthias.klein@credit-suisse.com

---

**Aimi Plant, Associate**  
+44 20 7888 7054  
aimi.plant@credit-suisse.com

### NEW YORK

11 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010

---

**James Sweeney, Managing Director**  
+1 212 538 4648  
james.sweeney@credit-suisse.com

---

**Wenzhe Zhao, Associate**  
+1 212 325 1798  
wenzhe.zhao@credit-suisse.com

---

**Jeremy Schwartz, Analyst**  
+1 212 538 6419  
jeremy.schwartz@credit-suisse.com

## Disclosure Appendix

---

### Analyst Certification

James Sweeney, Jonathan Wilmot, Matthias Klein, Aimi Plant, Wenzhe Zhao and Jeremy Schwartz each certify, with respect to the companies or securities that he or she analyzes, that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect his or her personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of his or her compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.

### Important Disclosures

Credit Suisse's policy is only to publish investment research that is impartial, independent, clear, fair and not misleading. For more detail, please refer to Credit Suisse's Policies for Managing Conflicts of Interest in connection with Investment Research: [http://www.csfb.com/research-and-analytics/disclaimer/managing\\_conflicts\\_disclaimer.html](http://www.csfb.com/research-and-analytics/disclaimer/managing_conflicts_disclaimer.html)

Credit Suisse's policy is to publish research reports as it deems appropriate, based on developments with the subject issuer, the sector or the market that may have a material impact on the research views or opinions stated herein.

The analyst(s) involved in the preparation of this research report received compensation that is based upon various factors, including Credit Suisse's total revenues, a portion of which are generated by Credit Suisse's Investment Banking and Fixed Income Divisions.

Credit Suisse may trade as principal in the securities or derivatives of the issuers that are the subject of this report.

At any point in time, Credit Suisse is likely to have significant holdings in the securities mentioned in this report.

As at the date of this report, Credit Suisse acts as a market maker or liquidity provider in the debt securities of the subject issuer(s) mentioned in this report.

For important disclosure information on securities recommended in this report, please visit the website at <https://firesearchdisclosure.credit-suisse.com> or call +1-212-538-7625.

For the history of any relative value trade ideas suggested by the Fixed Income research department as well as fundamental recommendations provided by the Emerging Markets Sovereign Strategy Group over the previous 12 months, please view the document at [http://research-and-analytics.csfb.com/docpopup.asp?ctbdocid=330703\\_1\\_en](http://research-and-analytics.csfb.com/docpopup.asp?ctbdocid=330703_1_en).

Credit Suisse clients with access to the Locus website may refer to <http://www.credit-suisse.com/locus>.

For the history of recommendations provided by Technical Analysis, please visit the website at <http://www.credit-suisse.com/techanalysis>.

Credit Suisse does not provide any tax advice. Any statement herein regarding any US federal tax is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purposes of avoiding any penalties.

### Emerging Markets Bond Recommendation Definitions

**Buy:** Indicates a recommended buy on our expectation that the issue will deliver a return higher than the risk-free rate.

**Sell:** Indicates a recommended sell on our expectation that the issue will deliver a return lower than the risk-free rate.

### Corporate Bond Fundamental Recommendation Definitions

**Buy:** Indicates a recommended buy on our expectation that the issue will be a top performer in its sector.

**Outperform:** Indicates an above-average total return performer within its sector. Bonds in this category have stable or improving credit profiles and are undervalued, or they may be weaker credits that, we believe, are cheap relative to the sector and are expected to outperform on a total-return basis. These bonds may possess price risk in a volatile environment.

**Market Perform:** Indicates a bond that is expected to return average performance in its sector.

**Underperform:** Indicates a below-average total-return performer within its sector. Bonds in this category have weak or worsening credit trends, or they may be stable credits that, we believe, are overvalued or rich relative to the sector.

**Sell:** Indicates a recommended sell on the expectation that the issue will be among the poor performers in its sector.

**Restricted:** In certain circumstances, Credit Suisse policy and/or applicable law and regulations preclude certain types of communications, including an investment recommendation, during the course of Credit Suisse's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in certain other circumstances.

**Not Rated:** Credit Suisse Global Credit Research or Global Leveraged Finance Research covers the issuer but currently does not offer an investment view on the subject issue.

**Not Covered:** Neither Credit Suisse Global Credit Research nor Global Leveraged Finance Research covers the issuer or offers an investment view on the issuer or any securities related to it. Any communication from Research on securities or companies that Credit Suisse does not cover is factual or a reasonable, non-material deduction based on an analysis of publicly available information.

### Corporate Bond Risk Category Definitions

In addition to the recommendation, each issue may have a risk category indicating that it is an appropriate holding for an "average" high yield investor, designated as **Market**, or that it has a higher or lower risk profile, designated as **Speculative** and **Conservative**, respectively.

### Credit Suisse Credit Rating Definitions

Credit Suisse may assign rating opinions to investment-grade and crossover issuers. Ratings are based on our assessment of a company's creditworthiness and are not recommendations to buy or sell a security. The ratings scale (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B) is dependent on our assessment of an issuer's ability to meet its financial commitments in a timely manner. Within each category, creditworthiness is further detailed with a scale of High, Mid, or Low – with High being the strongest sub-category rating: **High AAA, Mid AAA, Low AAA** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is extremely strong; **High AA, Mid AA, Low AA** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is very strong; **High A, Mid A, Low A** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is strong; **High BBB, Mid BBB, Low BBB** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is adequate, but adverse economic/operating/financial circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity to meet its obligations; **High BB, Mid BB, Low BB** – obligations have speculative characteristics and are subject to substantial credit risk; **High B, Mid B, Low B** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is very weak and highly vulnerable to adverse economic, operating, and financial circumstances; **High CCC, Mid CCC, Low CCC** – obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitments is extremely weak and is dependent on favorable economic, operating, and financial circumstances. Credit Suisse's rating opinions do not necessarily correlate with those of the rating agencies.

References in this report to Credit Suisse include all of the subsidiaries and affiliates of Credit Suisse operating under its investment banking division. For more information on our structure, please use the following link: [https://www.credit-suisse.com/who\\_we\\_are/en/](https://www.credit-suisse.com/who_we_are/en/). This report may contain material that is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Credit Suisse AG or its affiliates ("CS") to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. All material presented in this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, is under copyright to CS. None of the material, nor its content, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, transmitted to, copied or distributed to any other party, without the prior express written permission of CS. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of CS or its affiliates. The information, tools and material presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or the solicitation of an offer to sell or to buy or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. CS may not have taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor. CS will not treat recipients of this report as its customers by virtue of their receiving this report. The investments and services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about such investments or investment services. Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice, or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual circumstances, or otherwise constitutes a personal recommendation to you. CS does not advise on the tax consequences of investments and you are advised to contact an independent tax adviser. Please note in particular that the bases and levels of taxation may change. Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by CS to be reliable, but CS makes no representation as to their accuracy or completeness. CS accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report, except that this exclusion of liability does not apply to the extent that such liability arises under specific statutes or regulations applicable to CS. This report is not to be relied upon in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment. CS may have issued, and may in the future issue, other communications that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those communications reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and CS is under no obligation to ensure that such other communications are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report. CS may, to the extent permitted by law, participate or invest in financing transactions with the issuer(s) of the securities referred to in this report, perform services for or solicit business from such issuers, and/or have a position or holding, or other material interest, or effect transactions, in such securities or options thereon, or other investments related thereto. In addition, it may make markets in the securities mentioned in the material presented in this report. CS may have, within the last three years, served as manager or co-manager of a public offering of securities for, or currently may make a primary market in issues of, any or all of the entities mentioned in this report or may be providing, or have provided within the previous 12 months, significant advice or investment services in relation to the investment concerned or a related investment. Additional information is, subject to duties of confidentiality, available on request. Some investments referred to in this report will be offered solely by a single entity and in the case of some investments solely by CS, or an associate of CS or CS may be the only market maker in such investments. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgment at its original date of publication by CS and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. The value of securities and financial instruments is subject to exchange rate fluctuation that may have a positive or adverse effect on the price or income of such securities or financial instruments. Investors in securities such as ADR's, the values of which are influenced by currency volatility, effectively assume this risk. Structured securities are complex instruments, typically involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. The market value of any structured security may be affected by changes in economic, financial and political factors (including, but not limited to, spot and forward interest and exchange rates), time to maturity, market conditions and volatility, and the credit quality of any issuer or reference issuer. Any investor interested in purchasing a structured product should conduct their own investigation and analysis of the product and consult with their own professional advisers as to the risks involved in making such a purchase. Some investments discussed in this report may have a high level of volatility. High volatility investments may experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment is realised. Those losses may equal your original investment. Indeed, in the case of some investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment and, in such circumstances, you may be required to pay more money to support those losses. Income yields from investments may fluctuate and, in consequence, initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of that income yield. Some investments may not be readily realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the value, or risks, to which such an investment is exposed. This report may provide the addresses of, or contain hyperlinks to, websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to website material of CS, CS has not reviewed any such site and takes no responsibility for the content contained therein. Such address or hyperlink (including addresses or hyperlinks to CS's own website material) is provided solely for your convenience and information and the content of any such website does not in any way form part of this document. Accessing such website or following such link through this report or CS's website shall be at your own risk. This report is issued and distributed in Europe (except Switzerland) by Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, England, which is regulated in the United Kingdom by The Financial Services Authority ("FSA"). This report is being distributed in Germany by Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited Niederlassung Frankfurt am Main regulated by the Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht ("BaFin"). This report is being distributed in the United States and Canada by Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC; in Switzerland by Credit Suisse AG; in Brazil by Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse (Brasil) S.A or its affiliates; in Mexico by Banco Credit Suisse (Mexico), S.A. (transactions related to the securities mentioned in this report will only be effected in compliance with applicable regulation); in Japan by Credit Suisse Securities (Japan) Limited, Financial Instruments Firm, Director-General of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (*Kinsho*) No. 66, a member of Japan Securities Dealers Association, The Financial Futures Association of Japan, Japan Investment Advisers Association, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association; elsewhere in Asia/ Pacific by whichever of the following is the appropriately authorised entity in the relevant jurisdiction: Credit Suisse (Hong Kong) Limited, Credit Suisse Equities (Australia) Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Thailand) Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, Credit Suisse AG, Singapore Branch, Credit Suisse Securities (India) Private Limited regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (registration Nos. INB230970637; INF230970637; INB010970631; INF010970631), having registered address at 9th Floor, Ceejay House, Dr.A.B. Road, Worli, Mumbai - 18, India, T- +91-22 6777 3777, Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, Seoul Branch, Credit Suisse AG, Taipei Securities Branch, PT Credit Suisse Securities Indonesia, Credit Suisse Securities (Philippines) Inc., and elsewhere in the world by the relevant authorised affiliate of the above. Research on Taiwanese securities produced by Credit Suisse AG, Taipei Securities Branch has been prepared by a registered Senior Business Person. Research provided to residents of Malaysia is authorised by the Head of Research for Credit Suisse Securities (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, to whom they should direct any queries on +603 2723 2020. This research may not conform to Canadian disclosure requirements. In jurisdictions where CS is not already registered or licensed to trade in securities, transactions will only be effected in accordance with applicable securities legislation, which will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may require that the trade be made in accordance with applicable exemptions from registration or licensing requirements. Non-U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should contact a CS entity in their local jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise. U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should do so only by contacting a representative at Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC in the U.S. Please note that this research was originally prepared and issued by CS for distribution to their market professional and institutional investor customers. Recipients who are not market professional or institutional investor customers of CS should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to taking any investment decision based on this report or for any necessary explanation of its contents. This research may relate to investments or services of a person outside of the UK or to other matters which are not regulated by the FSA or in respect of which the protections of the FSA for private customers and/or the UK compensation scheme may not be available, and further details as to where this may be the case are available upon request in respect of this report. CS may provide various services to US municipal entities or obligated persons ("municipalities"), including suggesting individual transactions or trades and entering into such transactions. Any services CS provides to municipalities are not viewed as "advice" within the meaning of Section 975 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. CS is providing any such services and related information solely on an arm's length basis and not as an advisor or fiduciary to the municipality. In connection with the provision of the any such services, there is no agreement, direct or indirect, between any municipality (including the officials, management, employees or agents thereof) and CS for CS to provide advice to the municipality. Municipalities should consult with their financial, accounting and legal advisors regarding any such services provided by CS. In addition, CS is not acting for direct or indirect compensation to solicit the municipality on behalf of an unaffiliated broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, or investment adviser for the purpose of obtaining or retaining an engagement by the municipality for or in connection with Municipal Financial Products, the issuance of municipal securities, or of an investment adviser to provide investment advisory services to or on behalf of the municipality. If this report is being distributed by a financial institution other than Credit Suisse AG, or its affiliates, that financial institution is solely responsible for distribution. Clients of that institution should contact that institution to effect a transaction in the securities mentioned in this report or require further information. This report does not constitute investment advice by Credit Suisse to the clients of the distributing financial institution, and neither Credit Suisse AG, its affiliates, and their respective officers, directors and employees accept any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from their use of this report or its content. Principal is not guaranteed. Commission is the commission rate or the amount agreed with a customer when setting up an account or at any time after that.

Copyright © 2012 CREDIT SUISSE AG and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

Investment principal on bonds can be eroded depending on sale price or market price. In addition, there are bonds on which investment principal can be eroded due to changes in redemption amounts. Care is required when investing in such instruments.

When you purchase non-listed Japanese fixed income securities (Japanese government bonds, Japanese municipal bonds, Japanese government guaranteed bonds, Japanese corporate bonds) from CS as a seller, you will be requested to pay the purchase price only.